Could racial or religious bias within the United Nations be hindering efforts to prevent and punish the crime of genocide? I answer this question by surveying the UN response to a variety of alleged genocides, ranging from Biafra starting in the late 1960s to Syria starting in 2012. In terms of quantitative analysis, this article explores whether the UN response to claims of genocide is proportionate to the scale of actual harm, using absolute death tolls and percentage reductions in the populations of specific minority groups to assess harm. It finds that voting blocs based on racial or religious identity may be warping the UN response to potential genocides, resulting in disproportionate attention across cases. In this regard, the Arab League, the Non-Aligned Movement, and the Republic of Turkey appear to play important roles in shaping UN responses. In terms of qualitative analysis, the article surveys evidence that key actors at the United Nations may have been motivated by bias in framing collective responses to claims of genocide and other mass violence.
first century, the United Nations adopted racially, ethnically, and religiously biased conclusions about genocide. The officials charged with preventing and punishing this crime have ignored most small, generally unarmed and powerless ethnic and religious minorities in Africa and the Middle East. The definition of genocide varies dramatically as the United Nations and NATO are selective in condemning certain states' persecution or killing of minorities as criminal or genocidal. did would encounter very little opposition." 13 Iraq's invasion of Kuwait changed their calculus.
• In April 1994, Anyidoho was willing to remain in Rwanda to prevent a genocide, leading 300 or so Ghanaian troops against overwhelming odds. Despite his and his men's resolve, he had to act in defiance of a shortsighted Security Council resolution intended to draw down the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda to less than one-sixth of its former strength, precisely at the time of greatest danger of genocide. 14 • In 1997, Paul Marshall pointed out extensive discrimination against and prohibitions of public Christianity in Saudi Arabia and Iran. Little, if anything, was done to confront these threats to Arab and Persian minority groups. 15 Over the next decade and a half, this type of extremism spread to Iraq and Syria, decimating their non-Arab Christians. 16 The UN Charter contributed to the norm of nonintervention in cases of genocide. US president Harry Truman, in sending the UN Charter to the Senate in 1945, announced that the breaches of the peace of the world that had happened in 1914 and the 1930s had made a new treaty of peace vital. 17 From 1945 through 1955, the United Nations did not recognize any possibility of launching wars to protect individual persons or their civil rights or any legitimate military operations other than those in which UN members were defending themselves, whether individually or collectively through the Security Council. 18 States could have recourse to the World Court, which announced that "the Court can only regard the alleged right of [military] intervention as the manifestation of a policy of force, such as has, in the past, given rise to most serious abuses and such as cannot, whatever be the present defects in international organization, find a place in international law." 19 The orientation toward peace and dialogue in the Charter had parallels in the Genocide Convention. There was no clear statement in article 1 of the latter that one signatory could punish genocides committed on the territory of another country, for example by dropping bombs on the leader of the other country or by sending assassins to kill him or her. 20 In 1948, at least three of the major powers defeated a proposal to include a right of its "universal repression." 21 Although article 5 of the Genocide Convention requires signatories to have implementing legislation to punish and prevent acts of genocide, the United States had no such legislation nearly four decades after signing the treaty and suffered no ill effects at the international level on this basis. 22 Article 8 permits states to "call upon any competent organ of the United Nations" to take "action as may be appropriate under the Charter" to prevent or halt genocide, but this added little to the basic structure of the United Nations. Under article 8, genocide becomes a concept to be employed by the Security Council to justify collective intervention to restore international peace and security. 23 While article 9, especially when read in light of the Charter, creates an obligation to submit to the jurisdiction of the World Court (i.e., the International Court of Justice) in international disputes relating to the interpretation or application of the treaty, countries like Rwanda, Spain, and the United States have been able to evade this jurisdiction without penalty. 24 In one study of all wars conducted by the United States from before 1800 until after 2000, only one was found to have been initiated for non-defensive reasons, at least in theory-the 1999 war in Kosovo. 25 It could be argued that all the rest were justified as being waged in individual or collective self-defense rather than to prevent genocide. 26 With respect to the case of Kosovo, the view of an international commission was that the war had been illegal. 27 Similarly, in the case of Nicaragua v. United States, 28 the World Court rejected arguments that the human rights situation in Central America had justified military action, concluding that under article 2 of the UN Charter, "force may be used only in self-defence against an armed attack," which was "the original intent of the Charter and the positions commonly held by States." 29 No abstract right exists to back a more human-rights friendly "opposition" in another country, 30 a country's form of government being "essentially within the domestic jurisdiction" of that country's government. 31 Sovereignty remained alive and well in many parts of the world after 1998, when the ICC was created, in part to carry out the Genocide Convention's call for international punishment of the crime. When Meron urged countries to surrender their sovereignty to the ICC, he was rebuffed by most of them even as he went on to issue important rulings on the crime as a judge.
32 Indeed, for "three and a half decades . . . the world . . . waited for the United States to lend its support to the Genocide Treaty," despite "the killing of millions of Cambodians at the hands of the Pol Pot regime" and the mass killings of the Armenians, Ukrainians, and Jews prior to that. 33 When the United States did ratify the treaty, it adopted a sovereignty-protecting package of reservations and understandings intended to prevent it from being enforceable, which were similar to provisions adopted by most Communist countries, the Argentine and Spanish dictatorships, India, Morocco, the Philippines, Rwanda, and Venezuela. 34 Senator Jesse Helms remarked: "Thanks to the eight provisos-on reservations-that some of us insisted should be a part of the instrument, the sovereignty of our Nation and the freedom of our people have been protected against assault by the World Court."
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As most European countries and many members of the Commonwealth other than India and Pakistan, including the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, are members of the ICC, some argue that the United States is an outlier. 36 With the nonmembership of China, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Russia, and the United States, however, it would seem that nearly half of the world's population, most of the arms trade, and many armies are not covered. 37 While it joined the ICC, Britain ensured it would not reach its officials' conduct prior to 2001, although it later moved that date back to 1991 for domestic prosecutions. 38 Britain and France have also urged both domestic and international courts not to blame their governments for crimes committed by British or French troops in multinational forces, which are growing more common in conflicts like those in Iraq, Libya, and Kosovo. 39 Bosnia, Cambodia, Rwanda, and other genocide hotspots have ratified bilateral immunity agreements with the United States that are intended to thwart ICC jurisdiction. 40 By 1985, there had been as few as two genocide trials involving post-1945 conduct, for Cambodia and Equatorial Guinea. 41 There were few proceedings involving the massive crimes documented in Afghanistan, Biafra, Bangladesh, Chile, Ethiopia, Guatemala, Indonesia, Korea, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Sudan, and Vietnam. 42 Aside from the trial in absentia of the Khmer Rouge leaders, the genocide charges brought in Equatorial Guinea in 1979 and in Romania in 1991 represented the exception, not the rule. 43 Although the United Nations had the primary responsibility under the Genocide Convention to deal with allegations of genocide, it ignored numerous large massacres in favor of disproportionately condemning Israel for lesser infractions. 44 The Charter privileges powerful members or voting blocs to grant "blanket immunity in the Security Council to [the permanent, veto-wielding] countries and any close ally that country wishes to protect." 45 Only Israel and South Africa were "warned" by the Council from 1945 to 1990. 46 The UN Human Rights Council passed more than eight resolutions on Israel from 2006 to 2008, while there was an inadequate response to worse violations of human rights in Myanmar, North Korea, Sudan, and Zimbabwe. 47 UN members pressured the Council to devote less attention to Sudan at a point when it had passed nine resolutions on Israel but only three on the African state. 48 The Council's predecessor, the UN Commission on Human Rights, issued one-fourth of its country-specific resolutions about Israel despite far worse losses of life in other countries. 49 The "bloc" system of the United Nations "often result [s] in tactical voting on the wording and passing of resolutions and official statements." 50 Remarkably, in the case of Israel, the UN Security Council has complained of "aggression" and "loss of human life" affecting as few as one or two persons while refraining from using such strong language in other cases involving greater numerical losses. 51 The Hollow Promise of an End to Impunity through International Law Between 1993 and the turn of this century, a series of instruments adopted by the Security Council promised an end to impunity. This promise of an "end to impunity for the perpetrators of [grave] crimes" has not been met. 52 Most of the world's population lives in countries where the military will probably never be subject to the ICC, including China, India, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and the United States. 53 Only one judgment has been issued from the ICC during about 10 years of work. 54 The first individual brought before the ICC in relation to the situation in Sudan had his charges dismissed, and the first two Sudanese scheduled to go to trial are from the Sudanese opposition, not the regime. 55 The situation in Iraq, featuring more than 600,000 excess deaths since 2003, was not even fully probed. 56 Even those countries that signed the Rome Statute before it entered into force (e.g., the DRC, Uganda, and Zimbabwe) have continued to commit grave crimes with no prosecutions forthcoming. 57 Between 1996 and 2001-a period in which the Rome Statute was drafted and the DRC signed it-the Security Council took no robust measures to prevent or punish what it called widespread violations of international law and human rights in the DRC. 58 Similarly, the Security Council convened no trials of the Indonesian military or anti-Timorese Indonesian militia leaders who perpetrated massacres and widespread plunder and destruction of civilian infrastructure in East Timor in 1999. 59 In 2002, the same year that the Rome Statute entered into force and the ICC opened its doors, the DRC complained to the United Nations and the World Court that Rwanda and Uganda had invaded its territory, massacred civilians, and spread AIDS through mass rape. 60 A prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda who had dared to investigate the post-1994 Rwandan government's crimes was replaced by Britain and Rwanda for her temerity. 61 No Rwandans or Ugandans have been tried for crimes in the DRC despite serious crimes during their invasions. 62 The Rome Statute invokes the idea of collective justice and deterrence that individualized criminal procedures cannot achieve. This is an appropriate framework with which to analyze mass violence such as the one million-plus deaths since 1990 in Iraq, the DRC, and Sudan, or the 500,000 plus in Angola and Rwanda, 250,000 plus in Colombia and Uganda, or the 100,000 plus in Chechnya, Ethiopia, and Yugoslavia. 63 Yet charges have not been filed against most perpetrators of torture, massacres, looting, deportations and persecutions, deprivation of food and medicine, or cruel and inhuman treatment. 64 Only
Sudan received an involuntary Security Council referral to the ICC out of these 10 cases. 65 As set forth below, Sudan did not surrender the suspects and enjoyed immunity within the African Union.
The Problem of Racial, Religious, and Ethnic Bias within the United Nations Selective Labeling of Violence as "Genocide" Non-judicial punishment for genocide and crimes against humanity, in the form of calls for immediate regime change through support for undisciplined and violent rebel groups, has been all the rage since 1991 and the declaration of a New World Order. In 1992, the Security Council "condemn [ed] . . . the practice of 'ethnic cleansing'" and the denial of food and medical attention to civilians in Bosnia and Herzegovina, declared that all those committing or ordering such acts would be punished "individually," and demanded that all forces other than those under the "Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina" be disbanded and all towns "demilitarize [d] ." 66 The following April, the Security Council demanded the return of all land and property abandoned under duress in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and banned all shipments into Yugoslavia except food, medicine, and other humanitarian goods approved in advance by a UN committee. 67 With respect to Kosovo, the region that broke away from Yugoslavia in 1999, several world leaders condemned a "genocide" there after the killing of 45 persons in the village of Račak. They included the US president, UK prime minister, NATO secretary-general, Turkish prime minister, German foreign minister, and others. 68 After 5,000 people had fled the Račak area, 69 these leaders joined together to bomb Kosovo and Yugoslavia and to occupy the former under UN auspices. 70 The European countries, the United States, Canada, and the Arab League members demanded the violent overthrow of the leaders of Libya and Syria after less than one year of civil war but not the ejection of the government of Sudan from the Darfur region, the Nuba Mountains, or other parts of the country following four decades of massacres, denial of aid, oppression, and famine conditions claiming about 2.5 million lives. 71 US official rhetoric emphasizes the genocides in Nazi Germany, Cambodia, Iraqi Kurdistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Rwanda, Kosovo, and Sudan. 72 It tends to downplay other episodes of ethnic or religious violence, such as those against Kurds and Christians by troops and allied militias in Turkey; against Assyrian Christians and Shi'a Arabs by international terrorists active in central, western, and southern Iraq; against non-Arabs in Libya by extremist revolutionary brigades and international terrorists in 2011-2012; against Armenian and Assyrian Christians by the Free Syrian Army and its mercenary terrorist allies in Syria; by international terrorists against Christians in Mali, Nigeria, and the Central African Republic in 2011-2012; and by Rwandan and Ugandan forces and their militia allies against Hutus and Batwa since 1996 in the DRC. On 30 November 1992, the United States joined most of Europe, Turkey, Colombia, Peru, and Australia in condemning the "self-proclaimed Serbian authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia" for "the practice of ethnic cleansing," and called upon all states to "consider the extent to which the acts committed in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia constitute genocide." 73 In 2004, the United States and most of Europe, this time not joined by Turkey or any South American countries, welcomed the establishment of a commission of inquiry to determine whether acts of genocide had occurred in Darfur. 74 When, however, terrorists cleansed 20,000 Assyrian Christians from Baghdad in 2006-2008 and hundreds from Hassake, Syria, in 2011-2013, the United States did not call upon anyone to determine whether acts of genocide had occurred in these places. 75 As a US Army judge advocate serving as the special prosecutor for the UN-backed MultiNational Force-Iraq for terrorism-related cases before the Central Criminal Court there concluded in 2006, there are "few Christians in Iraq in part because some Moslems have a tendency to kill non-Moslems-now mostly Christians, because the majority of Iraq's Jewish population fled the violence decades ago." 76 Similarly, Mehmet Özkan and Birol Akgün argue that Turkey had to create "a new language on Darfur" in order to characterize the violence there as a "conflict" rather than an ethnic or racial genocide against non-Arab, "black" Africans. 77 The president of the Turkish Human Rights Association called Erdoğan's embrace of Sudan "an indication of the government's double-standard policy." 78 In 2013, the leader of the political opposition in Turkey pointed out that Sudan's leader, Omar al-Bashir, "got red-carpet treatment" from Erdoğan's government. Al-Bashir, who had come to power in a coup just as the leaders of Iraq and Libya, whom Turkey opposed, "has killed 300,000 people and 2.7 million were displaced. He has an international search warrant," the opposition leader said in reference to the genocide in Darfur. At the same time, the Turkish government was unfriendly with Egypt, Iraq, Syria, and Iran. In contrast, in Libya the United Nations authorized a war to prevent an alleged massacre. 80 The Gulf Arabs and NATO led a campaign to destroy government forces wherever they were found. 81 Explanations for the disparity between Libya/Syria and Sudan other than ethnic, racial, or religious bias are unpersuasive. 82 A political explanation other than Arab League support for Sudan is unlikely because the Sudanese dictatorship was worsemanaged and no more democratic than the Libyan or Syrian regimes. 83 Sudan is listed on the US state sponsors of terrorism list and has more oil than Syria but less than Libya. 84 The scale of the killing, of course, was much larger in Sudan. 85 Özkan and Akgün also speculate that Turkey declined to recognize the genocide in Darfur because of the "war on terror," but Erdoğan actually embraced the war on terror, bombing Iraq and waging war since 2003 on the Kurdish population centers blamed for harboring Kurdish rebels. 86 The Erdoğan government even showed a "lack of hesitation in supporting the [2003] war operations in Iraq," which many in the United States (including the current president) argued was not a part of the war on terror but a sideshow. 87 For these reasons, Eric Reeves has aptly written that Sudan's small peoples suffer from "racism of the worst sort, directly reflected in the diffidence and acquiescence on the part of the international community and the UN." 88 Religious Voting Blocs and Genocide at the United Nations The Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) members, including Iran, Turkey, and the Arab League, were very vocal on the Bosnian Genocide of 1992-1995 and the Kosovo "genocide" of 1999. In 1992, the Republic of Turkey submitted a draft resolution to the UN General Assembly condemning Yugoslavia for an alleged genocide against the Bosnian Muslim group. 89 In January 1999, Turkish prime minister Bülent Ecevit argued that "Kosovons [sic] are exposed to a genocide and a [sic] ethnic cleansing campaign." 90 In April, he called Serbia's counterinsurgency campaign in Kosovo a "genocide" and called for military intervention. 91 On the other hand, in Tehran in 2003, the OIC Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers condemned any charges against former Bosnian president Alija Izetbegović for involvement in war crimes against Serbs, or indeed any effort to investigate him for anything, arguing that he "led his people against Serbian oppression, campaigns of ethnic cleansing, genocide, massacres and dispersion of innocent people, destruction of places of worship and Islamic monuments." 92 No mention was made in this statement of Serbian refugees, victims of ethnic cleansing, or destroyed churches. In December 1999, Ecevit responded to criticism over Turkey's alleged inaction over Chechnya. He "said that Turkey is one of the countries that is most sensitive to the Chechen problem and that Turkey's reaction was shown by both himself and the foreign minister. He added that the government had stressed that the Russian operations against the Chechen rebels amounted to genocide." 93 By contrast, Turkey led the movement for non-recognition of the Darfur Genocide. Erdoğan traveled to Sudan in a prominent state visit in 2009 in order to declare that a Muslim could not commit genocide. 94 He announced that al-Bashir was less likely to be guilty than Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel. 95 Erdoğan's government went well beyond denying the Darfur Genocide, in fact. Turkey cultivated mutually beneficial relations with Sudan while making repeated charges of genocide against Israel, and served as a "direct arms supplier" to Sudan despite a UN embargo prohibiting this. 96 Simultaneously, Turkey criticized much less serious ethnic and religious violence in secular China as genocidal. In 2009, Erdoğan condemned the People's Republic of China for waging genocide against the Turkic Uighur Muslims of East Turkestan. 97 This followed the killings of perhaps dozens of Uighurs and Han Chinese in ethnic rioting in 2009 and protests in Turkey by the Eastern Turkestan Cultural and Solidarity Organization, which featured complaints of "systematic genocide." 98 Turkey, of course, was silent on massacres of Dinka and Nuba Christians in Sudan, which were much larger. 99 The Islamic Group, or OIC, may be carrying out the precepts of fundamentalist Islamic law in its members' diplomacy at the United Nations. Islamic law may reflect a directive by the religion's main prophet on his deathbed that there shall be only one religion "in the land of the Arabs." 100 In the nineteenth century, Muslims were taught that Jews occupied a twilight zone between humans and animals and that as traitors to the Arab cause, they needed to be killed or enslaved. 101 After 1945, the king of Saudi Arabia and the dictators of Egypt and Libya believed in the teachings of The Protocols of the Elders of Zion, which portrayed a Jewish conspiracy to occupy and plunder the world.
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The Arab states, including Qatar and Saudi Arabia, have joined with Turkey to condemn Syria for an anti-Sunni "genocide" of 2011-2013. In 2011, when the civil war had killed fewer than 20,000 people, the Arab League charged "genocide" in Syria. 103 It was supposedly focused in cities and towns with substantial Sunni Arab populations. 104 Erdoğan, before long, referred to the civil-war deaths as a "genocide." 105 In particular, he condemned one battle involving 150 deaths as one. 106 Along with Qatar, Turkey advocated for the cause of Syria's "opposition, whose dominant component is the Sunni community, including the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood." 107 This was a very dangerous course of action, for a Turkish commentator predicted "major sectarian strife if not a bloodbath" once the Syrian regime fell from power. 108 The wealthy Arab powers and Turkey have managed to mobilize larger blocs within the United Nations in favor of their idiosyncratic positions on genocide. The Non-Aligned Movement, in 1979, condemned racism in Israel/Palestine and South Africa as genocidal. 109 It was joined in this by the UN Committee against Apartheid in 1986. 110 Neither the OIC nor the Non-Aligned Movement seem to have recognized the genocide of the Dinka, Nuba, and other non-Arab peoples of southern Sudan, a genocide recognized by the United States in 2001 as involving two million deaths. Nor have these groups recognized the Darfur Genocide, although the United Nations claims that it has caused more than 300,000 deaths and academics have estimated it to have caused 450,000. 111 Yugoslavia's siege of Sarajevo and the Israeli siege of Gaza were far less productive of mass casualties, short life expectancies, and high infant mortality than Sudan's internal blockades of southern Sudan, the Nuba Mountains, and Darfur. Yet there was no genocide in Sudan, according to most countries. The Non-Aligned Movement has not been active in preventing the near-extinction of the Bambuti and Batwa, or "pygmies," of central Africa, groups that have lost one-third to one-half of their numbers to Hutu-and Tutsi-led killings and displacements. 112 In 2010, the news that entire indigenous groups were going extinct due to killings and massive deportations in Colombia triggered no visible reaction from the Non-Aligned Movement. 113 When 20,000 Tamils perished in a few weeks in Sri Lanka, the OIC and Non-Aligned Movement were not stirred to action. 114 The United Nations asked only that "the Sri Lankan Government should take the necessary follow-up measures." 115 No international criminal tribunal was convened in 2002 or 2003 after police in India participated in or tolerated the killing of hundreds of non-Arab Muslims. 116 The Western powers, speaking through NATO, are inconsistent in applying the Genocide Convention. A number of NATO states did not even condemn the Darfur crimes as genocide. 117 Most recently, the report of an International Commission of Inquiry and of countless journalists and human-rights groups that Libyan rebels were hunting and killing non-Arab Africans in 2011 resulted in no penalties. 118 Subsequent to that failure, the Sudanese government suffered little backlash for creating a massive famine in historic Nubia (South Kordofan) and South Sudan by blocking aid and trade to the area. 119 There have never been air strikes, no-fly zones, or international trials involving southern Sudan, South Kordofan, or other scenes of massacre in this region since 1980, even as no-fly zones were imposed on Bosnia and Libya and as air strikes were carried out in those countries and in Kosovo and Serbia. Some experts stopped using the word genocide with respect to Darfur once the International Commission of Inquiry of Darfur opined that the widespread killing of civilians in the region, including of children, did not reflect an intent to achieve a total genocide. 120 Might economic, political, or geostrategic interests have motivated the disparate responses to Iraq and Sudan, as opposed to Bosnia, Libya, and the former Yugoslavia? Economic interests are arguably more intense with Libya than Sudan, although Sudan also has five billion barrels of oil reserves that could be exploited. 121 There would seem to be little political benefit to be gained from preferring genocide prevention in Bosnia to a similar course of conduct in South Sudan, except the benefit flowing from Bosnian suffering receiving more media coverage than the plight of African victims of mass violence. 122 Just as Bosnia has a geostrategic proximity to Germany and Russia, and Libya to a variety of Mediterranean port cities, Sudan is close to the Suez Canal, Egypt, and the eastern Mediterranean.
Bias in Particular Instances: Iraq, Darfur, the Bosnian Serbs, and Turkey The mental element of genocide is the crime's element of dolus specialis, or specific intent. Prosecutors and judges deem it satisfied based on selective massacres, rapes, sieges of populated areas, and derogatory language, for example in the indictments, oral arguments, and pretrial decisions involving Radovan Karadzić, Ratko Mladić, and Slobodan Milošević for genocide in Bosnia. 123 In the case of Bosnian Serb defendant Mladić, the prosecutor of the international criminal tribunal argued that his intent was genocidal because he focused violence on non-Serbs, he perpetrated ethnic cleansing, his forces killed more than 150 Muslim men in a series of battles, his forces killed 30 people by shelling a Sarajevo marketplace, and his forces killed thousands of non-Serb civilians in Srebrenica in 1995. 124 In another case, a Bosnian Serb suspect was charged with genocide because international prosecutors held him responsible for the deaths of 66 Bosnian Muslims out of up to 700 persons under his control.
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The Genocide Convention is sometimes construed to require that the accused harbor at least the intent to destroy a "substantial part" of a group. This may be satisfied qualitatively, by killing a group's leaders, and not simply quantitatively, by killing absolutely or relatively large numbers of group members. 126 Thus, article 2(c) makes it genocide to intend to destroy a substantial part of a group by deliberately imposing conditions of life upon it that will certainly physically destroy at least some of its members. In theorizing this aspect of genocide, Raphael Lemkin wrote: "Genocide is, as we have noted, a composite of different acts of persecution or destruction," with some such acts harming property of group members, denying them income, driving them into hunger and disease, or making unavailable such "elementary necessities of life as warm clothing, blankets and firewood in winter." 127 With these legal principles in mind, the remainder of this section will describe gaps in the international response to genocide within countries, focusing on northern and south-central Iraq, western and southern Sudan, and eastern and western Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Iraq
There was no international criminal tribunal for Iraq, even though the United Nations used remarkably similar language to describe the situations in Iraq and Bosnia at about the same historical moment. 128 The United Nations opened a base in Sarajevo in March 1992, which it did not do during the 1987-1993 genocide in Iraq. 129 According to the Bosnian foreign ministry, 200,000 Bosnians were dead or missing by April 1993, while according to Iraqi Kurdish leaders, 182,000 Kurds were dead or missing by that time. 130 According to independent scholars, the death toll in Bosnia in 1992-1995 was between 67,000 and 305,000, with two-thirds (i.e., between 45,000 and 202,000) of them being Bosnian Muslims, while the toll in Iraq in 1988-1992 was 100,000-265,000 Kurds, with an additional 50,000-100,000 Shi'a Arabs in 1991-1992 and 258,000 mostly nonKurdish Iraqi soldiers and civilians due to the 1991 war with UN forces. 131 According to Human Rights Watch's reports, the toll in Bosnia was 250,000 "dead or missing," while the toll in Iraq was up to 100,000 deaths among the Kurds and up to 150,000 deaths in southern Iraq. 132 More than 50,000 Kurds and 50,000 Shi'a Arabs died during Iraq's 1991-1993 civil war violence according to the international press. 133 This is more than the number of Bosnians according to Bosnia. 134 The Arab League did not lead the way in calling for the United Nations to prevent or punish genocide in Iraq as they did in Bosnia and Palestine. 135 The newspapers from the era contain no report of the Arab League condemning a "genocide" of the Kurds or Shi'as in Iraq despite a death toll exceeding 50,000 deaths and possibly reaching 180,000. 136 When Iraq used chemical weapons on Kurds and Iranians in the late 1980s, the Arab League objected to a proposed investigation of the crimes. 137 Turkey, as well as Arab League members Egypt, Jordan, and Syria, continued to buy billions of dollars of oil from Iraq, frequently in violation of UN sanctions and at below-market prices. 138 Saudi Arabia and Turkey were happy that Hussein's "iron fist" kept the Kurds under Arab rule, it was said. 139 In 2007, the Iraqi High Tribunal convicted Ali Hassan al-Majid and other former officials of genocide and other crimes against the Kurds, finding that "tens of thousands" had died in fighting and deportations and due to devastation of homes and villages. 140 On appeal, it was pointed out that the Kurds were generally left alone in Iraq's large cities, such as Baghdad, Mosul, Kirkuk, and Arbil, but the Appellate Chamber upheld the genocide verdict. 141 The convictions for the Anfal Genocide against the Kurds in Iraq help clarify when a civil war becomes genocidal. The tribunal referred to many of the warning signs of genocide, such as civil war, political discrimination, refugee flight, and economic difficulties, 142 but in finding a genocide, it noted that tens of thousands of Kurds were killed. 143 This requirement of quantitative or qualitative scale might prevent a finding of genocide in China, Cyprus, Palestine, Kosovo, or Libya. The data on genocides are not favorable to the conclusion of the Arab League, the OIC, Iran, and Turkey that genocide occurred in these places but not in Iraq or Sudan. Table 1 sets forth this data. As it points out, Iraq has twice suffered far larger death tolls from campaigns of mass violence than have Gaza, Libya, Palestine, Syria, or China. Extremists have traveled from Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and other Arab countries to Iraq to perpetrate massacres of perceived non-Muslims by suicide and car bombings, devastating Assyrian Christian and neo-pagan groups as well as Shi'a Arab "infidels."
144 For about a decade, such attacks have taken place on a nearly daily basis. 145 The European Parliament has declared that the Assyrians, an "ancient and indigenous people," face "a danger of their culture becoming extinct in Iraq" because "the militant group Islamic State of Iraq, considered part of the international Al-Qaida movement, has claimed responsibility for [mass] killings and has vowed to launch further attacks against Christians." 146 Between 1,000 and 10,000 Assyrian families might flee a given attack or series of attacks. 147 Eventually, the Assyrians may dwindle, as the Iraqi Jews did, from thousands of families to a mere handful of persons. 148 As the targets adhered to the wrong religion, the United Nations has not responded. There has been no international tribunal trying al-Qaeda for crimes in Iraq. Some might argue that the death toll matters little in a genocide case for deaths may occur in battle or due to overall economic weakness, disparate susceptibility to disease or access to medical care, or other socioeconomic factors. In every case involving higher death tolls, however, there were discrete massacres equaling or exceeding those in the cases recognized by the Arab League and OIC as "genocides." For example, the United Nations condemned genocide in Bosnia based on mortars falling on marketplaces and hitting 16, 37, and 68 Bosnian civilians. 161 Many accusations of genocide in Kosovo came at the United Nations after it was reported that 45 Muslim civilians had been massacred in the village of Račak in January 1999. 162 In Iraq, just to take one example, 58 people were massacred in a church in 2010. 163 Similarly, numerous massacres of more than 16 people at a time took place in Darfur, Sudan. 164 The original purpose of the Genocide Convention, to ensure national minorities' survival, is frustrated by the use of genocide to advance racial, religious, and sectarian aims. Lemkin developed the concept in order to pierce the sovereignty of states and ensure the survival of their national minorities. 165 His hope was that international law would promote the continued existence of indigenous and minority peoples. 166 Threats to peoples' existence include not only killing but also malnourishment, denial of health care, expropriation of private property, discriminatory taxation of subject peoples, persecution of clerics and artists, and other cultural harms. 167 One recent example of a genocide that tracks Lemkin's definition is the pattern of violence and incitement against Iraqi religious minorities. Two co-prosecutors of the Extraordinary Chambers of the Courts of Cambodia, after an extensive study of religious persecution in Iraq from 2003 through 2008, concluded that these patterns supported an inference of genocidal intent against Assyrians in Iraq. 168 The Assyrian Christian population had fallen by as much as half from 2003 through 2006. 169 Ninety percent of members of the small Mandaean religious group had to flee Iraq after persecution, incitement, and threats. 170 As to each of these groups, the threat of extinction is much greater than that faced by Bosnians and Kosovars.
In contrast to the Assyrians and Mandaeans of Iraq, most of the peoples focused on by the Arab League and OIC as being "genocide" victims were not at risk of what Lemkin referred to as having their "national pattern" displaced or replaced. In Cyprus, the Muslim population went from roughly 100,000 in 1964 to 128,000 in 1992, despite Turkey's allegation of a genocide in 1974. 171 The Muslims of Bosnia/Herzegovina and Serbia/Montenegro may have increased in number from 3.75 million in 1991 to 3.9 million in mid-1994, during the period in which the Arab League and OIC continuously urged the UN General Assembly to condemn genocide against the Bosnian Muslims. 172 The Palestinian Muslim and Christian population rose from 1.3 million in 1946 to 4.2 million in 2010, despite the repeated condemnations of Israel for "genocide" in Palestine. 173 The Uighur population in China, including those in East Turkestan, increased from 7.2 million in 1990 to 9 million in 2009. 174 The Sunni Arab population of Syria soared from 12 million in 1999 to 16.7 million in 2011, under the "genocidal" Assad regime. 175 The population of Libya doubled from 1990 through 2010 during the Gaddafi era. 176 Another extreme incongruity about Bosnia, Palestine, Libya, and Syria is that the alleged victim group captured a large swath of territory and held it during the alleged genocide, while in other cases, such as the Armenian/Assyrian/Greek Genocide, the Holocaust, Biafra, and Cambodia, the victims were routed. Libya and Syria offered peace terms to rebel movements and at least partially respected some promises of nonaggression in areas that did not attack government-held territory. 177 The Palestinian, Libyan, and Syrian Sunnis were and are at less risk of disappearing, and therefore present relatively poor candidates for the prevention of genocide. Had similar peace terms been offered to the Christians of the late Ottoman Empire or the Jews of Nazi-held Europe, massive declines in their respective populations might have been prevented. Their populations did not grow, as in Gaza since 1948. For these reasons, the inattention to genocide in Iraq appears to result from racial or religious bias.
Sudan
Many authors attempt to distinguish the conflicts in Darfur and South Sudan from the one in Rwanda because the Sudanese conflicts are less one-sided, or genocidal. 178 Recent empirical research, however, suggests that those in southern and western Sudan are among the most one-sided in recent times. For example, research suggests that there was a 30/70 to 50/50 split in the breakdown of deaths in mass violence in Rwanda among Hutus and Tutsis, while the ratio of Darfurian to Arab Sudanese casualties is surely higher than 90/10.
179 This is what one might expect given the fact that the governments labeled as perpetrators by international tribunals lost territory and much or all of their sovereignty to some of the victims they feared. The Bosnian Serbs retreated to a small enclave subject to UN governance. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia suffered partition and defeat. The government of Rwanda fell to elements of the Ugandan army joined by Rwandan exiles and defectors.
Mortality statistics also indicate a greater threat to minorities in Sudan, which is outside the apparent zone of concern for "genocide" created by the Arab League and OIC, than to Bosnia, Libya, Palestine, or Syria. The life expectancy in Bosnia and Herzegovina was 75 years in 1994, after Turkey and the OIC stated that genocide had begun, 180 but only 42 years in Darfur during what Erdoğan and many OIC members claim to be nongenocide there. 181 Life expectancy in Palestine was also 75 years in 2010, after Turkey and various Arab countries had complained of Israel's new "genocide" there. 182 Life expectancy in Libya and Syria in 2009 also stood at about 74 years. 183 The deliberate infliction of conditions of life calculated to bring about the destruction of the group in whole or in part was even more damaging in South Sudan, but no international criminal tribunal was convened to focus on it. Two million or more South Sudanese died unnecessarily from the 1980s to 2001. 184 About 90% of persons in South Sudan live on $1/day or less, a level of extreme poverty that results in a slow genocide with many more casualties than the alleged genocides in Palestine or Syria. Saskia Baas and World Vision report that, due to Khartoum's attacks, life expectancy in South Sudan stood at only 42 in recent years, with child mortality at 150/1,000 births and gross domestic product (GDP) per capita at $90. 185 In Darfur, workers' incomes were estimated to be between $0.50/day and $2.50/day ($184-$923 per year, or 4,000-20,000 Sudanese dollars per month, for wage earners, depending on the number of days worked). 186 In Syria, the number of people living on less than $1/day was, until recently, less than 12%, and in Gaza the number also fell to a minority, as suggested by its 2009 GDP per capita. 187 In terms of average income per capita, the Gaza Strip had a per capita real GDP of more than $2,500 in 2009. 188 Bosnia and Herzegovina had a per capita GDP of more than $2,500 in 1994, 189 a figure not much lower than Turkey's own GDP per capita in 1990 and 1994 190 and higher than Iraq's GDP per capita of less than $2,000. 191 In contrast, Sudan had a $450 GDP per capita in the early 1990s and southern Sudan an even smaller one. 192 This indicates that denial of humanitarian aid, destruction of livelihoods and neighborhoods, and confinement in camps or besieged towns lacking food and medicine, conduct identified as genocidal in Bosnia, was even more extensive in southern Sudan.
Although the situation in Darfur has been referred to the ICC, according to its procedures, the trial of the Darfur Genocide suspects cannot begin in their absence. The ICC prosecutor only indicted Sudanese president al-Bashir in 2008, three years after the ICC referral, despite numerous killings, rapes, and mass deportations from the Darfur region in 2003-2007. 193 After some legal wrangling, 194 the Appeals Chamber of the ICC waited until 2010 to affirm whether President al-Bashir could even be tried for genocide. 195 This kind of individualized criminal procedure is inadequate for deterring ongoing atrocities. In the absence of procedures in the Rome Statute for determining collective accountability, however, Sudan's refusal to surrender the suspects, and other countries' granting of diplomatic immunity to them, blocked the ICC referral from having any practical effect. 196 The African Union welcomed al-Bashir to a summit in Abuja, Nigeria, in 2014, to the chagrin of anti-genocide activists. 197 Despite Sudan's noncooperation with the ICC, the United Nations did not press the issue of accountability for genocide as it had for genocide and/or war crimes in Bosnia, Kosovo, Libya, and Syria. Even the Bush administration, which was virtually alone among members of the United Nations in recognizing the genocide in Darfur, opposed the modest steps toward prevention embodied in the Darfur Peace and Accountability Act of 2006. 198 Financial experts within the administration wanted US public companies to be able to own stock in corporations trading with Sudan, especially Chinese corporations.
199
Eastern versus Western Bosnia (and Turkey) Initially, Samantha Power and other journalists claimed that 200,000 Bosnians had been killed, implying that few or no ethnic Serbs had died in Bosnia. 200 They echoed the Bosnian government, which alleged at the World Court that the Serbs had killed hundreds of thousands of its citizens. 201 Commenting on such claims, Luc Reydams and Jan Wouters argue that "the claim of impending extermination of Bosnian Muslims had no basis in the reports of the [UN Human Rights] Commission's own Special Rapporteur, who, in fact, had warned against 'disinformation, rumour, and propaganda.'" 202 When a Bosnian nongovernmental organization prepared a list of who had been killed in Bosnia and where during the war, it concluded that there had been more military than civilian deaths-57,500 versus 40,000-and that 33% of war-related deaths had not been among Muslims, who had accounted for 44% of the prewar population of the province. 203 This may indicate that there had been massacres and rapes of Serbs by Bosnian Muslim rebels, just as the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had argued to the World Court in 1997. 204 The press reported at the time on massacres of Serbs and rapes of Serbian women. 205 In the case of Milošević, the ICTY ruled that genocidal intent of a leader could be inferred from mass violence and biased actions. 206 Moreover, a US federal court ruled that the Bosnian Serbs' "brutal acts of rape, forced prostitution, [and] forced impregnation" were "part of a genocidal campaign conducted in the course of the Bosnian civil war." 207 However, no similar charges were brought against Bosnian leader Izetbegović, despite massacres and rapes of Serbian civilians and prisoners. 208 As the former civil affairs chief of the United Nations in Bosnia revealed in 2012, although more Serbs were ethnically cleansed from parts of Yugoslavia than any other group, no international tribunal held Izetbegović responsible for the scale of this displacement. 209 The forces of Izetbegović and his Croatian allies deported 100,000 Serbs from western Bosnia. 210 Yugoslavia submitted a 40-page analysis of the ethnic cleansing of Serbs to the World Court. 211 The crime of genocide also reaches acts aimed at "a significant section of a group such as its leadership."
212 In Bosnia and Kosovo, leaders of the Bosnian Muslim and Kosovar Albanian Muslim groups survived to become presidents of their respective countries. 213 Likewise, in the cases of China and Palestine, the main leaders of the victim groups have survived. 214 Among the Bosnian Serbs, however, a number of prominent leaders were killed or captured by international authorities. The priest of Trnovo, for example, was allegedly tortured and killed in 1992 by the Bosnian Muslim side. 215 The churches, chapels, and monasteries where Orthodox Christians had led the Serbs were reportedly destroyed. 216 Although the population of Bosnia and Herzegovina declined by 900,000 from 1990 to 1995, the Muslim population of the region in 1995 stood at one million and rose to 1.8 million by 2007. 217 By way of contrast to the large populations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Palestine, and Syria, there were only 84,000 Armenian, Assyrian, and Greek Christians remaining in Turkey as of 1992, but there had been no "genocide" against these groups according to Turkey's various prime ministers and presidents. 218 Instead, there was Armenian "terrorism" against Turkey.
219 The genocide has not ended in the impoverished Kurdish and Assyrian towns and villages of the country's southeast. 220 Infant mortality stands at 10 times the level in western Turkey 221 and is far higher than the comparable figures for Bosnia in 1995 and for the Gaza Strip in [2009] [2010] . 222 This indicates that poverty due to internal displacement, destruction of villages, internal blockades, and discriminatory denial of food and medical aid, identified as genocidal in allegations involving Bosnia and Palestine, is also a serious problem in southeastern Turkey.
Amnesty International has called on Turkey to "accede to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and to implement it in national law in accordance with conventional and customary international law" and not to "undermine its text." 223 Turkey has resisted, fearing prosecutions for crimes against Kurds in Iraq and Turkey. 224 This left it as the only member of the Council of Europe not to have ratified the ICC statute, but non-ratification was common in the Middle Eastern context, including in Qatar and Iran. 225 Such non-ratification helps members of the Arab League and OIC organize and assist in the perpetration of massacres in Iraq, Israel, Sudan, Syria, and elsewhere. For example, Turkey took part in the NATO intervention in Kosovo in 1999 despite having committed arguably worse crimes in its own southeast. 226 The death toll from violence involving Turkey's Kurds over the years is as high as 65,000 since 1920 and more than 20,000 since 1980, as compared with fewer than 20,000 in Kosovo and fewer than 2,000 in Gaza. 227 Yet Turkey's civil war has not been declared a threat to international peace and security by the United Nations, nor has it been condemned as a genocide, and there will probably never be an ICC or other indictment involving Turkey's Christians and Kurds. 228 Cultural and "legal" genocide are prominent in Turkey's contemporary politics. In 2011, the chairman of a US congressional subcommittee, who later became chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, announced that "that the Turkish Government's formal, longstanding efforts to control religion by imposing suffocating regulations . . . results in serious religious freedom violations," creating a "climate of impunity against religious minorities." 229 Only in Saudi Arabia is the Christian population facing a risk of extinction comparable to that in Turkey. These two countries may be among the only ones in the Middle East with Jewish and Christian populations of less than 1%. 230 That compares with a Muslim population in Bosnia in 1991-1995 of about 40% and in Palestine of about 90%. 231 
Conclusion
There is a double standard when it comes to how some UN member states recognize and condemn the crime of genocide. UN members have condemned "genocides" and "massacres" in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Palestine, Kosovo, Libya, Syria, and even western China in much more rapid and prominent ways than they have condemned other, clearly more severe cases of mass killing coupled with refugee flight, hunger, and disease, as in Darfur and southern Sudan.
The Genocide Convention contains a number of open-ended concepts and ambiguous phrases that make judging genocide difficult. The treaty, as with many legal rules, lends itself to biased, arbitrary, and sometimes contradictory invocations and noninvocations. Even within the same conflict, similar acts such as massacres may be charged as genocide or war crimes and lead to interventions or convictions while other massacres evade even an investigation. This is the ultimate failure of the law of genocide. continued massive and grave violations of human rights by the Government of Iraq, such as summary and arbitrary executions, torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, enforced or involuntary disappearances, arbitrary arrests and detentions, lack of due process and the rule of law and of freedom of thought, of expression and of association, as well as the existence of specific and serious discrimination within the country in terms of access to food and health care, . . . the forced displacement of hundreds of thousands of Kurds and at the destruction of Iraqi towns and villages, . . . orchestrated mass executions and mass graves throughout Iraq, extrajudicial killings, including political killings, in southern Shiah centres and in the southern marsh area . . . periodic shelling of agricultural lands belonging to Iraqi Kurds.
Situation of Human Rights in Iraq, UN Commission on Human Rights Res. 1994/75 (9 March 1994), 266-70. The same month, it referred to massive and systematic violations of human rights, particularly the practice of "ethnic cleansing" still under way in the territory controlled by Bosnian Serbs, as well as similar acts being done by Bosnian Croat extremists, whose principal victims are the Bosnian Muslim populations, . . . the horrible massacre at the Markale market in Sarajevo on 5 February 1994, which resulted in the renewal of the international community's determination to bring an end to the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina . . . the indiscriminate shelling of civilian populations, . . . the forced deportation of populations, the attacks against civilian targets, continued detention of civilians in appalling conditions in prisons and camps, the use of military force against defenceless civilians, the continued practice of rape as a weapon of war and the strategy of strangulation of populations by obstructing food supplies and other essentials to civilian populations.
